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Citizenship Status and Patterns of Inequality in the United States and Canada 
Sofya Aptekar 
 
Objective: This study investigates inequalities in the distribution of citizenship status among 
immigrants in Canada and the US between 1970 and 2001.  It is motivated by a desire to probe 
deeper into the gap in citizenship rates between the two countries. 
Methods: Logistic regression analysis of Census data is used to predict the odds of citizenship 
among the foreign-born, controlling for a range of factors.  
Results: There has been a growing inequality in the distribution of citizenship in the US, but not 
in Canada.  Low rates of citizenship hide the appearance of a large disparity in citizenship 
between those with the lowest levels of education and everyone else.  These results cannot be 
entirely ascribed to the presence of undocumented immigrants.  
Conclusion: Persistent and large inequalities in citizenship leave the already disadvantaged 








In Canada and the US, citizenship brings a range of rights and benefits, such as the ability 
to vote and run for public office, access to some desirable jobs and educational benefits, travel 
passports, and safeguards from deportation.  High rates of citizenship among the foreign-born, 
such as those found in Canada, signal success in immigrant incorporation.  Low citizenship 
uptake in the United States, on the other hand, raises questions about hurdles in the naturalization 
process and boundaries erected around national membership.  Moreover, inequality in the 
distribution of the rights and benefits of citizenship along axes of stratification such as 
socioeconomic status can compound social inequality and limit the political representation and 
collective mobility of immigrant groups (Portes and Curtis, 1987).  I demonstrate the growth of 
citizenship inequality in the United States since the 1970s, with the least educated falling 
precipitously behind.  I show that a contemporaneous increase in naturalization in Canada was a 
tide that lifted all boats: differences in citizenship by educational level are minor.  
This article relies on analyses of Canadian and American census data from 1970 to 2001.  
Comparisons with Canada in the study of American immigration are relatively rare, despite the 
many parallels in immigration trends and policies, which allow for similar case analysis (Lipset, 
1989; Zolberg, 1996).  In the case of naturalization, this cross-country comparison is particularly 
compelling due to the large and growing gap in citizenship rates.  Until the 1980s, rates of 
citizenship among the foreign-born in Canada and the US were similar, at around 60%.  But 
while the proportion of immigrants who are citizens in Canada has steadily increased to 75% in 
2001, it has declined to 40% in the US in the same time period (Bloemraad, 2006b, see Figure 1).  
I look at the relationships between a range of demographic and contextual factors and citizenship 
status, evaluating various theoretical understandings of naturalization and exploring the 
implications for larger processes of stratification.  I begin with an overview of immigration and 
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naturalization policies in the two countries and a description of the economic, contextual, and 
assimilation models of citizenship acquisition.  I then present the analytic results and attempt to 
account for the trends over time and differences between Canada and the US.  
[Figure 1 about here]  
 
Immigration and Naturalization in Canada and the US 
There are many similarities in the immigration history and policies of Canada and the US.  They 
are settler nations, populated by European migrants who pushed out the native population.  
Citizenship for immigrants in both countries is based on the jus soli, or birthright citizenship 
principle, and access to citizenship has been very similar since the post-World War II period 
(Weil, 2001).  The residency requirements in Canada are three years (five years prior to 1977), 
and five years in the US.  In both countries, there are lengthy waiting periods, with backlogs 
varying by location, as well as examinations of language proficiency, civics, and history, and a 
litany of forms and fees.   
Canada and the US also share similar immigration policy trajectories. Ethnicity-based 
restrictive policies implemented in the 1920s were lifted in both countries in the 1960s in favor 
of more equitable policies, which eventually led to an influx of immigrants from developing 
countries.  Canada has long had a higher proportion of immigrants among its population: by 
2001, 18% of the total population was foreign born compared to 13% in the US (Malone et al, 
2003; Statistics Canada, 2003).  The mix of national origins is also different: China and India 
supply 36% of all immigrants to Canada, while immigrants from Mexico are 30% of the foreign-
born in the US (Malone, et al 2003; Statistics Canada, 2005b).  Finally, Canada admits many 
more skill-based immigrants through its point system than the US, where most immigrants come 
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through family reunification provisions.  Nonetheless, on average, immigrants in the two 
countries have similar levels of education (Bloemraad, 2006a).  Although only Canada officially 
recognizes dual citizenship, there is a de facto dual citizenship regime in the US because laws 
governing renunciation of other allegiances are rarely enforced (Kivisto and Faist, 2007).  
Moreover, dual citizenship laws in Canada and the US often clash with the laws of sending 
countries, which may rescind citizenship from those gaining citizenship of another country or 
make it impossible to give up original citizenship.  Regardless, there is also evidence that many 
immigrants do not claim dual citizenship, even when they technically have it (Bloemraad, 2004).   
Despite the many similarities between naturalization processes and benefits of 
naturalization in Canada and the US, the proportion of immigrants with citizenship in the US has 
fallen far below that in Canada.  The rate of acquiring citizenship has also decreased in the US 
while increasing in Canada, and immigrants from every origin have lower proportion naturalized 
in the US, even when disaggregated by cohort (Bloemraad, 2006a).  Irene Bloemraad (2002, 
2006a, 2006b) makes a strong case for the role of institutional factors as the explanation for the 
citizenship gap between Canada and the US: the Canadian government programs actively 
encourage and support citizenship acquisition, treating it as a right, whereas the US has a far less 
interventionist approach that leaves citizenship up to the individual.  Bloemraad’s conclusions 
rest on cross-sectional analyses of 1990/1 census data for Portuguese and Vietnamese immigrant 
groups, as well as extensive qualitative research.  I build on her work – and that of others (e.g. 
Bueker, 2005; Liang, 1994; Pantoja and Gershon, 2006; Yang, 1994) – by examining 
naturalization patterns in the entire immigrant populations in Canada and the US over thirty 
years, and by focusing on the potential of citizenship to exacerbate existing inequalities.  As 
such, this paper is of interest to scholars of inequality more generally.  
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Citizenship and Inequality 
Several theoretical perspectives are useful in explaining the mechanisms through which 
citizenship comes to be unequally distributed and overlap with other social categories.  Rational 
choice economic maximization models presume autonomous actors who weigh the costs and 
benefits of acquiring citizenship.  Citizenship is attractive as a way of maximizing earnings 
through access to jobs and federal contracts, academic scholarships, and travel passports.  The 
higher one’s education and income, the more one can expect to benefit from acquiring 
citizenship.  The positive relationship between socioeconomic status and citizenship among 
immigrants has been amply documented in Canada and the US (e.g. Balistreri and Van Hook, 
2004; Bloemraad, 2002; Bueker, 2005; DeVoretz and Pivenko, 2005; Jones-Correa, 2001; Liang, 
1994; Mata, 1999; Pantoja and Gershon, 2006; Van Hook, Brown and Bean, 2006; Yang, 1994).  
Aside from potentially higher earnings and better employment opportunities, naturalization gives 
immigrants priority in sponsoring family migration to the US (but not to Canada).  Given 
financial requirements of sponsorship, immigrants with higher socioeconomic status may be 
more interested in this benefit of citizenship.  At the same time, immigrants with lower 
socioeconomic status may be more likely to have relatives who want to move to the US 
(Bloemraad, 2006a).  Since 1996, federal welfare benefits in the US have been contingent upon 
citizenship.  Thus, immigrants with low levels of education may try to maximize their income 
through naturalization, reducing class differences in the distribution of citizenship status (Borjas, 
2002).  In that case, the socioeconomic gradient of citizenship may, in fact, be steeper in Canada 
because welfare benefits there are not contingent on citizenship.  However, previous studies have 
shown little evidence that welfare eligibility is related to naturalization in the US.  Rather, the 
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passage of the Welfare Reform Act – and contemporaneous measures that made deportation of 
permanent residents much easier – served as a signal to all immigrants about the precariousness 
of permanent resident status and the potential for further curtailment of rights (Balistreri and Van 
Hook, 2004; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006).  
The costs of naturalization range from the time and money invested in the application 
process to potentially relinquishing the benefits of previous citizenships.  Application fees and 
citizenship tests are more costly for immigrants with lower levels of education.  At the same 
time, highly skilled immigrants are more likely to own property or have business interests in 
other countries – benefits that they may lose when acquiring American or Canadian citizenship.  
On the other hand, acquiring citizenship may aid the cosmopolitan lifestyle of the highly skilled 
immigrants.  The growing number of sending countries allowing dual citizenship in the 1990s 
may be reflected in increasing naturalization rates among the highly-skilled between the 1990/1 
and 2000/1 Census waves (Sejersen, 2008).   
Another way of looking at naturalization is by considering contexts of exit and 
reception.  Immigrants from geographically distant countries, or countries with repressive 
regimes, may be more likely to become citizens due to the difficulty in reversing their migration 
(Bueker, 2005; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996).  In contrast, immigrants who come to the US from 
Mexico and Canada have lower citizenship rates than other groups partly due to the relative ease 
with which they can reverse their immigrant status (Bloemraad, 2006a).  The reversibility thesis 
is undermined, however, by research indicating that citizenship acquisition can actually be a 
means to increased transnational activity by easing travel to and contacts with the home country 
(Gilbertson and Singer, 2003).   
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Contexts of reception are different in Canada and the US.  Although Canada has fewer 
affirmative action-type measures than the US, government assistance to ethnic groups – 
including assistance in naturalizing – is likely to increase naturalization among those with low 
socioeconomic status compared to the US, which lacks such policies (Bloemraad, 2006a). 
Immigrants also confront contexts of reception conditioned by prevailing frameworks of dealing 
with difference.  For instance, Hispanic immigrants face a hostile context of reception in the US, 
which may make it less likely that they seek citizenship or are able to overcome the hurdles in 
acquiring it (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996).  Empirical research shows that Canada and the US are 
comparable in their attitudes toward racial minorities, although social and economic distance 
between groups is lower in Canada (Reitz and Breton, 1994).  In addition, there are sub-national 
differences in the context of reception.  For instance, there is local level variation in anti-
immigrant sentiment and political mobilization of immigrant groups.  In Canada, the province of 
Quebec has its own point system for selecting independent immigrants, although the federal 
government continues to regulate family migrants and refugees (Grenier, 2003; Labelle and 
Salee, 2001).  With more emphasis on assimilationist policies than the rest of Canada, we might 
expect residence in Quebec to be negatively associated with having citizenship status.  The 
difference in the institutional contexts of Quebec and the rest of Canada are likely to be much 
greater than the differences between American states.   
Citizenship acquisition can also be viewed as a by-product of the assimilation process.  
With successful adaptation comes commitment to the host country and a change in the identity of 
the individual, which are then formalized through naturalization (Gordon, 1964).  The 
assimilation model is quite complementary to the economic model of naturalization since it also 
predicts that immigrants with higher levels of education and income will be more likely to 
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naturalize – because they are better integrated into society.  Moreover, simply the length of time 
spent in the host country will play a decisive role in whether an immigrant has naturalized, 
serving as a proxy for increased adaptation to and understanding of the host society.   
 
Data and Methods 
This paper uses four waves of census data for each country: 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001 
for Canada and 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 for the US (Ruggles et al, 2004; Statistics Canada, 
1971; 1982; 1994; 2005a).  I use the 1% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the US 
Census for all waves, 1% PUMS Files from the 1971 Canadian Census, 2% from the 1981 
Canadian Census, and 3% from the 1991 and 2000 Canadian Census.  The sample in this study 
includes foreign-born aged 25 and over at the time of the census.  I merge the waves of each 
dataset to create two combined datasets.  Since naturalization decisions are likely to differ for 
immigrants who arrive as children or those who acquire college education in the host country, 
analysis is limited to foreign-born individuals who immigrated at age 18 and over.  Neither 
dataset includes information about the timing of naturalization, making it impossible to establish 
causal relationships between determinants and citizenship status.  To reduce the possibility of 
reverse causality, I restrict analysis to respondents who immigrated between 5 and 15 years 
before the census.  The American census includes foreign-born individuals who are not eligible 
to be naturalized because they are not permanent residents but are either resident foreigners or 
undocumented migrants.  The 1971 and 1981 waves of the Canadian data are similar to the 
American census in this limitation.   
The dichotomous dependent variable indicates whether the foreign-born respondent was a 
naturalized citizen at the time of the census.  The primary determinant of interest is level of 
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education, and I also control for income, age at the time of the census, time since migration, sex, 
and marital status.  Income is measured as the natural log of the total personal income in the year 
prior to the census year, adjusted and converted to the value of the US dollar in 1999 using 
Purchasing Power Parities and Consumer Price Index (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006; US 
Department of Labor, 2009).  For US models, I include dummy variables for states and major 
metropolitan areas.  For Canada, I control for residence in Quebec.  Logistic regression is used to 
test the association between level of education and the odds of citizenship, including interaction 
effects between year of the census and education. 
 
Results 
Table 1 presents proportion naturalized in each educational category by census year.  
Overall, the distribution of citizenship varies far more by level of education in the US than in 
Canada.  The gap in citizenship between levels of education has increased in the US while 
remaining small in Canada.  For instance, 42% of immigrants with less than high school 
education and 45% of those with college education were citizens in the US in 1970.  By 2000, 
this gap of 3% has increased to 20%, with only 18% of the least educated holding citizenship 
status.   
Table 2 presents results of logistic regressions predicting citizenship status of immigrants 
in Canada and the US.  The associations with the level of education, as well as the interaction of 
education with the year of the census, reach statistical significance in many cases, particularly in 
the US.  In addition, income is positively related to citizenship status, with each additional 
percent of total yearly income associated with 2.7% higher odds of citizenship in Canada and 1.4 
% higher odds of citizenship in the US.1  Other controls are statistically significant as well, 
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including age (positive in Canada), time since migration (positive in both), being male (positive 
in Canada, negative in the US), and being married (positive in the US).  Living in Quebec is 
associated with a 35% increase in the odds of citizenship holding other factors constant.  In the 
US, most state and municipality coefficients do not reach statistical significance (not shown, 
available upon request).   
In order to interpret the relationship between level of education and citizenship status 
over time, it is best to refer to Table 3, which shows predicted probabilities.  The predicted 
probability of being a citizen in the United States was around 45% for all educational groups in 
1970.  Controlling for other factors, immigrants grew progressively less likely to be citizens over 
time across educational categories.  However, those with less than high school education fell 
farther behind everyone else.  By 2000, the predicted probability of having citizenship for that 
group was only 18%, compared to 32% among high school graduates, and 40 and 39% for those 
with some college and college educations.  Canadian data reveals an almost flat educational 
profile of citizenship in 1971, at around 43%, controlling for other factors.  By 2001, predicted 
probabilities of citizenship are much higher but are still within a narrow range of 76 to 83%.  The 
increase in probability of citizenship in Canada did not come at the cost of higher inequality by 
education level.2 
[Tables 1, 2, 3 about here] 
Figure 2 shows the odds of having citizenship status by country or region of origin.3 
Compared to immigrants from Germany, immigrants to Canada from the US have significantly 
lower odds of being citizens.  The highest relative odds of having citizenship in Canada are 
found among immigrants from USSR and Africa, followed by those from Poland and Asia.  
Immigrants from United Kingdom and Italy are not statistically different than immigrants from 
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Germany.  The US Census allows for a more detailed disaggregation by country or region of 
origin.  In the US, only Canadian and Northern European immigrants have lower odds of 
naturalization than Mexicans, the largest immigrant group.  The Japanese and Central Americans 
are not significantly different than immigrants from Mexico.  The highest odds of naturalization 
are to be found among the Vietnamese, immigrants from the USSR, the Philippines, and the 
Middle East.  The group with the next highest odds includes immigrants from Eastern Europe, 
China, and Korea.  Only somewhat different from Mexican immigrants in the US are immigrants 
from Oceania, Western Europe, South America, Central Europe, and Cuba.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
As mentioned, a shortcoming of the US Census data is the inability to identify and 
exclude undocumented immigrants (who are not eligible for citizenship) from analysis.  Thus, it 
is possible that the increasingly negative association between less than high school education and 
odds of being an American citizen observed here is due to the presence of this disproportionately 
unskilled population.  It is estimated that over half of undocumented migrants in the US come 
from Mexico (Passel, 2005).  Therefore, I excluded immigrants born in Mexico, as well as those 
born in Central America (altogether eliminating approximately 85% of the undocumented) to 
explore the possibility that my results are affected by the presence of those ineligible for 
citizenship (see Tables 2 and 3).  One notable difference is that the predicted probability of being 
a citizen is higher for every level of education once Mexican and Central American origin 
immigrants are excluded.  In addition, the drop in predicted probability among the least educated 
from 20 to 18% between 1990 and 2000 is actually an increase from 23 to 31% once the most 
likely to be undocumented are excluded.  This indicates that the undocumented could very well 
have been depressing the odds of citizenship for the unskilled in this time period.  Yet the 
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dramatic declines in proportion naturalized – as well as the predicted probabilities of citizenship 
controlling for other factors – occurred between 1970 and 1990, and not when the undocumented 
population mushroomed in the 1990s (Passel, 2005).  Therefore, the inclusion of the 
undocumented in the US Census cannot be the entire explanation for the dramatically declining 
odds of citizenship among American immigrants with the lowest levels of education between 
1970 and 1990.     
 
Discussion 
Rates of naturalization grew in Canada and declined in the US in the decades leading up 
to the millennium.  The contribution of this paper is the analysis of inequalities hidden in these 
trends.   In the US, citizenship status and the benefits it conveys came to be more unequally 
distributed, with unskilled immigrants faring worse than their skilled contemporaries, and worse 
than the unskilled in previous decades.  In Canada, on the other hand, the significance of 
education for citizenship acquisition remained low.  Some of the growth in citizenship inequality 
in the US is due to the growing undocumented population, which is disproportionately unskilled 
and ineligible for citizenship.  Nevertheless, the growing inequalities and declines in 
naturalization rates became apparent long before the massive growth in undocumented migration 
to the US.  Traditional economic maximization and assimilation theories would point to an 
explanation that hinges on the costs and benefits of acquiring citizenship.  What happened in the 
1970s and 1980s to raise the costs of naturalization and lower its benefits for immigrants, 
particularly unskilled immigrants?  In fact, benefits of citizenship for immigrants remained the 
same until 1996: voting, improved ability to sponsor family migration, eased travel, and access 
to some jobs.  The costs, on the other hand, may have increased as the vast immigration 
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bureaucracy confronted a dramatic upswing of immigrants without amending naturalization 
procedures to improve on the typical “Long Gray Welcome” (North 1987).  It is this alienating 
and labyrinthine process, with backlogs lengthening in response to the growing numbers of 
immigrants, which may have been responsible for the lower uptake of citizenship, particularly 
among the unskilled, for whom these hurdles were higher.  This, of course, is part of the 
American context of reception, described and contrasted to the Canadian alternative by 
Bloemraad (2002, 2006a, 2006b).  After the reforms of 1996, the benefits of US naturalization 
increased dramatically, not only because of access to welfare benefits, but as an opportunity to 
escape the sudden precariousness of the permanent resident status.  Combined with changes in 
many sending countries’ citizenship laws, this led to what appears to be a reversal of a twenty 
year downward trend, although not a reversal of the growing inequality in citizenship.  
Meanwhile, the low significance of education for naturalization in Canada is consistent with the 
expansion and consolidation of multiculturalism policies in the 1970s and the lowering of 
barriers to citizenship in the Citizenship Act of 1977 (Kaplan, 1991).  Given Canada’s proactive 
approach to naturalization of immigrants – outreach and funding of various programs – it is not 
surprising that immigrants with the lowest levels of education are not as disadvantaged as they 
are in the US.   
Another factor of importance in this analysis appears to be the context of exit.  In both 
countries, the more “reversible” the migration is, the less likely are migrants to become citizens: 
migrants from repressive political regimes and/or migrants from far away have the highest odds 
of acquiring citizenship, while those from neighboring countries and countries with democratic 
regimes have the lowest odds, controlling for other factors.  In the US, these patterns of 
naturalization intersect with patterns of racial stratification.  Immigrants from Mexico and 
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Central and Southern America have some of the lowest odds of citizenship.  They are closely 
followed by black immigrants from the West Indies and Africa.  The low odds of having 
citizenship for Hispanic and black immigrants exacerbates the disadvantages experienced by 
Hispanic and black populations in the US in general.  The Asian label obscures variability: 
immigrants from some parts of Asia have much lower odds of naturalization than others, 
controlling for other factors.  Race does not have the same significance in Canada as it does in 
the US (Reitz and Breton 1994). There are relatively few Hispanic immigrants in Canada but 
other ‘visible minorities’, including black and Asian immigrants, have relatively high odds of 
citizenship.  In fact, the lowest odds are to be found among white groups.  Refugees in the US 
receive additional government assistance in acquiring citizenship, so the association between 
country of origin and odds of citizenship could reflect that factor as well.  Cuba is an exception: 
one would expect high odds of citizenship because of the refugee status of the immigrants and 
the difficulty in returning, but being from Cuba is associated with relatively low odds of 
citizenship.   
Place of residence once in the host country matters as well.  Since Quebec stresses 
assimilation to the Francophone culture (Grenier, 2003; Labelle and Salee, 2001), we might 
expect residence there to negatively impact the odds of naturalization compared to the rest of 
Canada, where multiculturalism policies facilitate feelings of trust and loyalty to the government.  
However, living in Quebec is associated with significantly higher odds of citizenship than living 
in other Canadian provinces, even when origin countries are held constant.  In fact, previous 
studies have found that immigrants in Quebec are more likely than immigrants to other provinces 
to speak neither English nor French, and to subsequently transition to using English (Beaujot, 
2003).  In addition, although Quebec has some freedom in deciding which immigrants to admit, 
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naturalization is still managed from Ottawa and is clearly about joining Canada.  Perhaps, 
immigrants in Quebec have higher odds of citizenship because they are resisting Quebec’s 
efforts at assimilation – or reacting to the difficulty of integrating into the Quebecois identity 
group – by becoming Canadian, not Quebecois.  Further research is needed to investigate this 
counterintuitive finding.  In the US, there were a few statistically significant effects of living in 
different states (available upon request), although it is difficult to discern any coherent patterns. 
This analysis is focused on citizenship status among recent adult immigrants, not the 
entire immigrant populations of Canada and the US.  Other types of immigrants, such as 
longtime residents and immigrants who arrived as children, are likely to have higher incidence of 
naturalization.  For the population examined, however, there is not simply a growing national 
gap in naturalization rates between Canada and the US, but a hidden growing inequality in how 
citizenship is distributed in the US.  
 
Conclusion 
Trends in citizenship acquisition by immigrants flag failures and successes of immigrant 
incorporation in multicultural democracies. But gross trends can hide additional patterns of 
inequality that map onto existing systems of stratification.  The differences in citizenship status 
by level of education among Canadian immigrants are small, dwarfed by the sheer size of the 
increase in naturalization rates for everyone in the last thirty years. Even the least educated 
immigrants in Canada are naturalizing at almost twice the rate of the most educated immigrants 
in the US.  The situation in the US, on the other hand, is a cause for concern.  Persistent and 
large inequalities in citizenship leave the already disadvantaged unskilled immigrants without the 
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access to rights, representation, security, and job and educational opportunities that citizenship 
brings.   
The US Citizenship and Immigration Service (the government agency responsible for 
immigrant naturalization) has been working on directly promoting citizenship acquisition, which 
may increase the rates of citizenship among the most disadvantaged.  Despite some post-9/11 
delays in application processing, the number of newly naturalized immigrants is high in the 
2000s (USDHS, 2009).  The same period, however, saw the development of a new and far more 
rigorous naturalization test.  Aside from raising the citizenship hurdle for the unskilled, this test 
is indicative of the ongoing anxiety about the ‘cheapening’ of citizenship in the US (Preston, 
2007).  In addition, by 2008, naturalization fees increased from a few hundred dollars to $675 
(compared to only $200 in Canada).  Thus, it seems unlikely that current American naturalization 
policies can adequately reverse the dismal rates of naturalization and the inequality hidden 
within these rates. 
  High naturalization rates alone are not a guarantee of successful immigrant integration.  
There are many forms of exclusion that continue to affect immigrants regardless of citizenship 
status.  Nevertheless, citizenship at least holds the potential of inclusion.  With that in mind, 
Canada is more successful at immigrant incorporation.  The US could probably raise 
naturalization rates, especially among the disadvantaged segments of immigrant population, by 
replicating some of the Canadian programs that promote citizenship and assist in the 
naturalization process through English and civic classes. Concern over the consequences of 
extremely low rates of naturalization and the compounded disadvantage of the least educated 
should outweigh anxiety over maintaining high boundaries around citizenship.   
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1. Inclusion of an instrumental variable measuring expected gain in income from acquiring 
citizenship did not significantly alter the results of these models.  The variable itself was 
statistically significant but had the value of 1.000 (odds ratio). 
2. I also ran separate models for each educational group.   These results are in line with those 
reported for the entire immigrant population, with two exceptions.  In Canada, living in Quebec 
is only positively associated with citizenship for those with less than college education.  In the 
United States, time since migration has a significant and positive coefficient only for those with 
college education.   
3. No measure of dual citizenship was included in the analysis. Controls for country or region of 
origin were used instead.  Many of the sending countries that adopted dual citizenship provisions 
did so at the very end of the period under consideration, and this should not change the trends 
observed between 1970 and 1991. 
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Table 1.   Percent Naturalized by Level of Education and Year of Census 







 US CA US CA US CA US CA US CA 
All  23.8 60.6 34.3 63.2 39.8 71.6 40.7 74.7 32.4 67.0 
1970/1 41.6 42.6 45.3 41.8 45.5 42.6 44.7 42.0 43.4 42.3 
1980/1 27.2 52.3 37.6 60.4 38.8 60.2 44.7 66.4 34.5 58.5 
1990/1 20.3 70.9 32.3 71.2 38.9 74.9 40.8 76.9 30.9 73.5 
2000/1 18.2 76.5 31.6 77.8 39.8 78.4 38.6 82.5 30.0 78.9 
Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. 
Note: The sample is limited to immigrants who are aged at least 25 and arrived in Canada or the US 
between 5 and 15 years prior to the census at age 18 or higher. 
 
Table 2.  Selected Odds Ratios from Logistic Regressions Predicting Citizenship Status 
of Immigrants in Canada and the US. 
 
Canada United States 
United States without 
Mexico & Central 
America 
Age 1.005*** 0.999 0.998*** 
Years since migration 1.173** 1.217*** 1.237*** 
Male 1.066** 0.929*** 0.928*** 
Married  0.955 1.189*** 1.193*** 
Highest level of education   (ref: high school)   
  Less than high school 0.951 0.793*** 0.772*** 
  Some college 0.974 0.986 0.977 
  College 0.908 0.824** 0.812** 
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Logged income 1.027*** 1.014*** 1.015*** 
Census year (ref: 1970/1)    
  1980/1 2.237*** 0.599*** 0.577*** 
  1990/1 2.360*** 0.447*** 0.421*** 
  2000/1 3.219* 0.446*** 0.463*** 
  Quebec 1.349***   
Interaction effects: edu*year    
  Less than hs * 1980/1 0.653*** 0.855** 0.864* 
  Less than hs * 1990/1 0.924 0.811*** 0.656*** 
  Less than hs * 2000/1 0.923 0.729*** 0.840** 
  Some college * 1980/1 1.027 1.057 1.073 
  Some college * 1990/1 1.384** 1.260** 1.343*** 
  Some college * 2000/1 1.163 1.288*** 1.276** 
  College * 1980/1 1.458** 1.302*** 1.320*** 
  College * 1990/1 1.705*** 1.427*** 1.490*** 
  College * 2000/1 1.673*** 1.268*** 1.194* 
N 57,521 138,554 98,372 
Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. 
Note: The sample is limited to immigrants who are aged at least 25 and arrived in Canada or the US 
between 5 and 15 years prior to the census at age 18 or higher.  The models also include controls for 
country/region of origin and states and selected metropolitan areas in the US. 
 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.  Predicted Probabilities of Citizenship Status by Level of Education and Year  
 
US - All 
 
Canada-All 













than hs HS 
Some 
college College 
1970/1 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45  0.43 0.40 0.43 0.43  0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 
1980/1 0.27 0.38 0.39 0.45  0.52 0.60 0.60 0.67  0.32 0.39 0.40 0.45 
1990/1 0.20 0.32 0.39 0.41  0.71 0.72 0.72 0.77  0.23 0.35 0.42 0.42 
2000/1 0.18 0.32 0.40 0.39  0.76 0.78 0.78 0.83  0.31 0.38 0.44 0.40 
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Figure 1.  Percentage of Citizens Among All Foreign-Born Residents in the 





















Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 




Figure 2.  Odds Ratios for Country/Region of Origin in Multiple Regressions 
Predicting Citizenship Status in Canada and the US. 
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Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
White bar indicates statistically non-significant at the p<0.05 level. Black bar is the omitted category. 
